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12Abstract
Two behavioral models of two-person normal-form game play are presented and es-
timated, using three experimental data sets. The models are variants of the Quantal
Response Equilibrium model de…ned by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, Games and
Economic Behavior), but allow a player to hold inaccurate beliefs about the behavior
of her opponent. Each model involves two parameters: One captures the player’s own
level of response rationality, the other the level she attributes to her opponent. In
order to allow for type heterogeneity among the subjects in the experiments, para-
metric distributions of these parameters are assumed. The estimation results indicate
that the subjects’ choices follow a speci…c anomalous pattern: On average, subjects
play as if they signi…cantly underestimated their opponent’s rationality.
JEL codes: C23, C91. Keywords: beliefs, prediction accuracy, experiments
31 Introduction
In analyses of game play data, the question often arises whether agents can be as-
sumed to hold beliefs about their opponents’ behavior that are on average correct.
Particularly if one allows for boundedly rational decisions (or random perturbations in
the subjects’ utilities), the assumption that all players are perfectly informed about
their opponents’ propensities to err may not necessarily be satis…ed. The inter-
pretation of observed decisions, however, may crucially rely on whether or not this
assumption is made.
In this paper, two closely related models of two-person normal-form game play
are formulated and estimated, both of them allowing for relatively general sets of
beliefs about the opponent’s behavior. The models are based on the Quantal Re-
sponse Equilibrium (QRE) de…ned by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), who proposed a
statistical reaction function prescribing the players’ choice probabilities. In contrast
to the standard QRE analysis, the behavioral models used in this paper each involve
a second response function which a player attributes to her opponent’s play, without
restricting the actual choices of the opponent to follow this perceived behavior. For
example, both players of a two-person game are allowed to view their opponents as
highly irrational agents without responding irrationally to these beliefs themselves.
Or, the models also allow the agents to perceive their opponents as behaving more ra-
tionally than they do themselves (where rationality is understood as precision of best
4responding to given beliefs). It can therefore be tested whether subjects in laboratory
experiments systematically mispredict the degree of their opponents’ rationality and
what kinds of mispredictions the subjects exhibit. For the data considered below, the
estimation results suggest a consistent pattern of subject behavior: On average, sub-
jects choose as if they signi…cantly underestimate the rationality of their opponents
(or simply tend to ignore the other player’s choices) and relatively consistently play
best responses against these beliefs.1
Several models of normal-form game play that also focus on the beliefs subjects
hold about their opponents’ actions have been estimated and tested in the experimen-
tal literature. Stahl and Wilson (1995) formulate a multiple-type model, following
Nagel’s (1995) step-j-thinking approach, in which each player is assumed to belong
to one of several types of players: A ’level-0’ type chooses randomly with equal
probabilities over his actions, a ’level-1’ type consistently plays a best response to
level-0 behavior (i.e., views her opponents to choose at random), a ’level-2’ type best
responds to a mixture of level-0 and level-1 types, a Nash type chooses Nash Equilib-
rium strategies, a ’worldly’ type responds to a hypothetical mixture of level-0, level-1,
and Nash types, and a ’rational expectations’ type correctly anticipates the propor-
tions of all types in the subject pool and chooses a best response to the resulting
1To be more precise, one of the two models produces this result for all three data sets. Under
the assumptions of the other model, the analogous result shows up for two of the three data sets,
with a reverse (and weakly signi…cant) result for the third.
5probability distribution over the opponent’s action set. The model is estimated using
a set of 3x3 normal-form games, resulting in estimated proportions of about 17%
of the subjects being level-0 types, 20% level-1 types, 2% level-2 types, 17% Nash
types, 43% worldly types, and 0% rational expectations types. In Stahl and Wilson
(1994) and Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), related models are estimated from di¤erent
sets of normal-form game data. Their results, however, suggest quite di¤erent type
distributions in the subject pools.2
In the context of the present study, at least two conclusions can be drawn from
these experimental papers. First, there appears to be a large variance in the sub-
jects’ behavioral patterns and in their beliefs about the opponents’ play. No single
type of player can account for the greater part of the observed behavior in the three
experiments. (Rather, the estimation results seem to be highly sensitive toward the
underlying sets of player types in the models and/or toward the speci…c games used
in the experiments.) Second, both the Nash type and the level-1 type constitute non-
negligible parts of the subject populations in all three experiments. In terms of beliefs
attributing a certain degree of rationality to one’s opponents, both extremes seem to
2Stahl and Wilson (1994), whose model includes only the level-0, level-1, level-2, and Nash types,
report estimates of 24% level-1 types, 49% level-2 types, 27% Nash types, and an insigni…cant
proportion being level-0 types. The model by Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) includes a number of
additional types, but also the level-1 and Nash types, which are estimated to account for 23% and
8% of the subject pool, respectively.
6be present in the subject pools.3 Given this evidence, the question adressed here is
whether the extent to which subjects implicitly rely on the opponent’s rationality
does, in the aggregate, re‡ect the actual response rationality (with which subjects
respond to their beliefs). This question cannot be answered within the multiple-type
models cited above, because in the construction of the player types’ beliefs, some of
the types are left out of consideration, so beliefs cannot coincide with actual behavior.
In contrast, the behavioral models de…ned below make use of the symmetric struc-
ture of the Quantal Response Equilibrium, in the sense that a player is aware of the
fact that her opponent follows the same behavioral model as herself. At the same
time, since the models allow for inaccurate perceptions of the opponent’s response
precision, the ”rational expectations” assumption made in previous QRE analyses is
relaxed and can be tested. To this end, the two models each involve two parameters
in their basic formulations: One parameter represents the response precision that a
player has herself, the other the precision level that she attributes to her opponent.
3For further results supporting this observation see the games conducted by Van Huyck et al.
(1990, 1991), Beard and Beil (1994), Schotter et al. (1994), Nagel (1995), Ho et al. (1998), Haruvy
and Stahl (1998), and Stahl (1999). The question remains, however, whether the observed choices
can in fact be seen as responses to explicit beliefs held by the subjects, or whether the apparent
belief distortions are due to decision heuristics that do not in any consistent way involve responding
to beliefs about one’s opponents. On this issue see Huck and Weizsäcker (2002) who use direct
methods of belief elicitation to con…rm the apparent level-1 behavior in experimental games.
7The two models di¤er only with respect to the error structure that is assumed, one
using a logistic error speci…cation, the other uniform errors. Both models include
as special cases the level-0, level-1, and Nash types of Stahl and Wilson (1995), as
well as a continuum of other types. In order to allow for variance in beliefs and in
precision of responses to given beliefs, the models’ parameters are assumed to be
distributed according to parametric distributions (with given functional forms), and
the distributions are estimated using maximum-likelihood techniques. The resulting
two econometric models are comparably ‡exible in terms of allowing for a variety of
beliefs and response behavior, and they each involve four parameters that are to be
estimated from the data.
The experimental data sets used in the statistical analysis are taken from the
studies by Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995) and Costa-Gomes et al. (2001).4 The
estimation results show that the average belief that subjects hold about their oppo-
nent’s response precision is signi…cantly below the actual average response precision.
This can be interpreted as a failure of the ”average” subject to predict her oppo-
nent’s rationality accurately: Subjects act as if they tend to ignore their opponents’
rationality, and could earn more in the experiments if they did not do so.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section formulates
4Some of the games are not appropriate for estimating the models, so not all of the data will be
used (see Section 3).
8the general behavioral model and the two special cases that will be used in the
statistical analysis. An example and a short discussion accompany the de…nitions.
Section 3 presents the maximum-likelihood estimation. In order to give an impression
of the robustness of the results, the estimations are also conducted separately for the
three data sets, and for a number of other subsets of the experimental games. Section
4 concludes.
2 Two models of normal-form game play
Consider a …nite two-player game ¡ = fa;b;Aa;Ab;ua;ubg with players i = a;b, where
Ai is player i’s action set and ui(¢); ui : Aa £ Ab ¡! <; is player i’s (von Neumann-
Morgenstern) utility function, which is assumed to be bounded. Let mi = #Ai be the
number of actions i has to choose from. Furthermore, let Qi be the set of probability
distributions over Ai, i.e., Qi is player i’s set of mixed strategies, where, for any
¼i 2 Qi; ¼i(ai) denotes the probability that ai 2 Ai is chosen according to ¼i:
The basic concept of the subsequent analysis is to make use of response functions
attributed to the players. De…ne the actual response function of player i, denoted
by ri(¢); ri : Qj ¡! Qi; as the mixed strategy that i chooses in response to a mixed
strategy ¼j 2 Qj of player j. For example, ri(¼j) could be an element of the best







j); i;j 2 fa;bg;i 6= j.
9Or, ri(¼j) could be a constant function not depending on ¼j, e.g. the uniform distri-







mi); i 2 fa;bg.
To allow for general beliefs about the opponent’s strategy, de…ne also the perceived
response function of player j, e rj(¢); e rj : Qi ¡! Qj, as the belief that i holds about
the response function employed by j, with i 6= j. In analogy to the above examples,
e rj(¼i) could e.g. be an element of BRj(¼i) or be equal to the constant function P
j
0.
Using these two response functions, a slight variation of McKelvey and Palfrey’s
de…nition of a QRE strategy can be given as follows.5
De…nition 1 For a given pair of response functions (ri(¢); e rj(¢)), player i’s strategy






If player i plays a QRE strategy for (ri(¢); e rj(¢)), she assumes that j acts according
to e rj(¢) and responds herself to this belief according to ri(¢), such that the above
5De…nition 1 and the de…nition of a QRE strategy in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) are not
equivalent because in their formulation the response functions have to be derived from maximization
in a random-utility environment. This theoretically more satisfying approach is, however, much more
”de…nitionally intensive”. The special cases of the QRE strategies used in the data analysis below
will be accompanied by random-utility justi…cations, one of them strictly along the lines of McKelvey
and Palfrey (1995).
10…xed-point property holds. For example, if (ri(¢); e rj(¢)) are best responses of the
two players, then a QRE strategy ¼i is a Nash Equilibrium strategy. Notice that
the actual behavior of player j does not enter the de…nition of a QRE strategy –
rather it is only i’s perception of j’s behavior that matters. The approach is entirely
decision-theoretic, because the QRE is understood here as an equilibrium as perceived
by player i: The …xed-point property above makes a choice prediction for only one
player, i, who behaves as if both players play according to a QRE with response
functions (ri(¢); e rj(¢)). In the data analysis, the fact that QRE strategies are de…ned
with respect to one player only (in the version of De…nition 1) will allow the case that
the predictions for the two players of a game are inconsistent.
In order to obtain well-de…ned choice predictions that can be analyzed using data
from experimental games, it remains to specify the form of the response functions ri(¢)
and e rj(¢). Before turning to the data analysis in Section 3, the following subsections
therefore present two parametrized special cases of QRE strategies.
2.1 Asymmetric Logit Equilibrium strategies
First de…ne ui
k(¼j) to be player i’s expected utility from playing the (pure) action ai
k








l0); i;j = a;b.
Player i’s actual response function ri(¢) is the logistic response function with precision
parameter ¸
i (¸
i ¸ 0) if for all actions ai
k 2 Ai and all player-j strategies ¼j 2 Qj it
11holds that the probability weight on the action ai
k, denoted by ri
k(¼j;¸












The logistic response function has the property that the probability weights on the
actions ai
k are ordered in correspondence to the ordering of the expected utilities
ui
k(¼j), k = 1;:::;mi. Also, varying the precision parameter ¸
i corresponds to varying
the distance between the logistic response and the best response to ¼j. The greater
¸




i) approaches zero if and only if ai




l(¼i) to be j’s expected utility from action a
j
l chosen in
response to strategy ¼i. Then, the perceived response function e rj(¢) is the logistic




¸ 0) if for all a
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l 2 Aj and all
¼i 2 Qi it holds that the probability weight on a
j




















De…nition 2 For given precision parameters ¸
i and e ¸
j
, let ri(¢) and e rj(¢) be the
logistic response functions with ¸
i and e ¸
j
respectively. Then player i’s strategy ¼i is




¼i is a QRE strategy for (ri(¢); e rj(¢)).
The class of ALE strategies allows for a relatively wide variety of game play
12behavior. For example, in the special case that ¸
i and e ¸
j
are equal, ¸
i = e ¸
j
=
¸, the set of ALE strategies with parameters (¸
i; e ¸
j
) is equal to the set of Logit
Equilibrium strategies with parameter ¸, as de…ned by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995).
Hence, any Logit Equilibrium strategy is an ALE strategy. As with Logit Equilibrium
strategies, a player takes the opponent’s propensity to choose non-optimal responses
intoconsideration when playing an ALE strategy (as well as the fact that the opponent
does so, too, and so on) and chooses in accordance with the solution of the resulting
…xed-point problem. However, the di¤erence between the two choice predictions is
that playing an ALE strategy a player with a precision parameter ¸
i is not assumed
to attribute the identical parameter value to her opponent’s behavior. The parameter
e ¸
j
only re‡ects i’s expectation of j’s behavior, and no consistency or ”rationality” of
expectations will be imposed in the data analysis below.6
Also, the class of ALE strategies encompasses most of the player types introduced
6Player i’s second-order belief concerning the response precision, i.e. the belief she supposes her
opponent to hold about ¸
i, is assumed to be correct, as in the Logit Equilibrium. Although this
assumption could, in principal, be relaxed as well, such a more general analysis is not attempted
here. One may argue that it is more natural to assume that second-order beliefs coincide with the
”true” precision level ¸
i than to assume that …rst-order beliefs (e ¸
j
) do, because second-order beliefs
concern the player’s own behavior. However, it is clearly possible that a misspeci…cation of second-
order beliefs leads to the apparent distortions of …rst-order beliefs that are reported in Section 3. For
alternative speci…cations of second-order (and higher-order) beliefs in models of quantal response
see Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995), Goeree and Holt (2000) and Kübler and Weizsäcker (2002).
13by Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995). In particular, if ¸
i = 0 holds, then i is a level-0
type. If ¸
i = 1 and e ¸
j
= 0, i is a level-1 type. In the case ¸
i = e ¸
j
= 1, i is
a Nash type. Hence, the class of ALE strategies can be seen as a two-dimensional
continuum between these three archetypical patterns of behavior. For intermediate
values of ¸
i and e ¸
j
, player i exhibits a ’worldly-like’ behavior: She considers j to be
neither completely irrational nor unboundedly precise in his responses, and she takes
into account the fact that j believes her, i, not to be perfectly rational either.7
As an illustration, consider the 2x2 game ¡1 given in the Table I, which is one of
the games used for the data analysis in Section 3. In ¡1, the column player’s strategy
R is dominated, and the game has a unique Nash Equilibrium at (U;L).
Insert Table I about here.




in Figure 1.8 Figure 1a depicts the graph of the row player’s ALE strategies for
7Due to the symmetric structure of the ALE strategy, player i is assumed to expect her opponent
j to exhibit this ’worldly-like’ behavior, too, if (¸
i;e ¸
j
) > 0. In contrast, the worldly type of Stahl
and Wilson (1995) expects level-0, level-1, and Nash behavior but does not believe in the existence
of other worldly players.
8The strategies were calculated with a grid-search algorithm similar to the ”Gobit-All” algorithm
used in the software package Gambit, which produces QRE strategies (see McKelvey et al., 1996).
The entries in the matrix were transformed into US$ payo¤s in the same way as in the experiment
by Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), where the game was used; see Appendix B.
14varying values of e ¸
col
: ¸
row is held constant at ¸
row = 16, and e ¸
col
varies on a
logarithmic scale. In Figure 1b, e ¸
col
is held constant at e ¸
col
= 16, and ¸
row varies.
Both parts of the …gure show the ALE probability of the row player choosing action
U (marked ”Pr(U)”) and the row player’s corresponding belief about the column
player’s probability to choose L (marked ”Pr(L)”).
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Figure 1a illustrates the dependence of the row player’s behavior on the precision
parameter e ¸
col
that she attributes to the column player. For small values of e ¸
col
,
implying in a perceived strategy of the column player that is close to the uniform
distribution, the row player ”rationally” responds with almost none of the probability
weight lying on U. As e ¸
col
increases, i.e., as the column player’s hypothetical response
becomes closer to the best response, the row player increases her probability weight
on U, and eventually (for large values of e ¸
col
) her strategy approaches the Nash
Equilibrium strategy. Figure 1b, on the other hand, shows that regardless of the
value of her own precision parameter ¸
row, the row player expects her opponent
to choose L (which is his best response) with almost full probability mass, so she
responds by playing U with the greater probability. Again, for large values of ¸
row,
i.e., as her own response precision gets larger, her ALE strategy approaches the Nash
Equilibrium strategy.
Viewing the game from the perspective of the column player, notice that due
15to the symmetric structure of the QRE condition (see De…nition 1) it holds that
whenever ¼i is an ALE strategy for player i with parameters (¸
i; e ¸
j
) it is also true
that ¼j = e rj(¼i; e ¸
j




column player’s hypothetical choice probabilities depicted in the …gure can equally
be viewed as his actual choice probabilities prescribed by ALE strategies with the
parameter constellations in the reverse order.
Following this interpretation, Figure 1b also shows that the column player’s actual
ALE behavior with a precision level of ¸
col = 16 does not depend on his belief about
the row player to any signi…cant degree. Since R is a dominated strategy, it is always
a best response for the column player to choose L. Similarly, in Figure 1a, as ¸
col
rises (for a given value of e ¸
row
), more and more probability mass lies on L, and the
column player’s ALE strategy approaches the Nash Equilibrium strategy.9
9An ALE strategy can alternatively be viewed as the equilibrium choice distribution in a game
with random errors (following extreme-value distributions) perturbing the payo¤s. For Logit Equilib-
rium strategies, this was demonstrated by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). Following their approach,
one can immediately establish two important properties of ALE strategies: First, ALE strategies
exist for all values of (¸
i;e ¸
j
), and second, if ¸
i and e ¸
j
both converge to in…nity, any limiting ALE
strategy is a Nash Equilibrium strategy of the unperturbed game. These results follow from McK-
elvey and Palfrey (1995), Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, respectively. For a discussion see also McKelvey
and Palfrey (1998) as well as Zauner (1999), who applies di¤erent speci…cations of the error structure
to random-utility models. A common interpretation of such random-utility perturbations is to view
162.2 Asymmetric Noisy Nash Equilibrium strategies
This subsection presents a parametrization of QRE strategies that is, although some-
what less elegant, easier to compute and to interpret than the one in the previous
subsection. This second model is the uniform-error analogon to the class of ALE
strategies, meaning that the players are assumed to erroneously choose non-optimal
responses with constant probabilities, which do not depend on the expected utilities
resulting from these actions. Speci…cally, some proportion of the probability weight
in a player i’s response function is assumed to lie on the uniform distribution over all
of her mi actions, Pi
0.
Player i’s actual response function ri(¢) is called the uniform-error response func-














(¼j) is an arbitrary element of i’s set of best responses to ¼j, BRi(¼j), and
i;j 2 fa;bg;i 6= j. Analogously, player j’s perceived response function e rj(¢) is called















(¼i) 2 BRj(¼i), i;j 2 fa;bg;i 6= j.
them as representing the impact of computational errors.
17De…nition 3 For a given pair of error rates (²i;e ²
j), let ri(¢) and e rj(¢) be the uniform-
error response functions with ²i and e ²
j respectively. Then player i’s strategy ¼i is an
Asymmetric Noisy Nash Equilibrium strategy (ANNE strategy) with parameters (²i;e ²
j)
if ¼i is a QRE strategy for (ri(¢); e rj(¢)).
As with ALE strategies, the class of ANNE strategies encompasses a variety of
behavioral patterns, depending on the pair of parameters (²i;e ²
j). If ²i = 1, then i
is a level-0 type and fully randomizes between her actions. If ²i = 0 and e ²
j = 1
hold, i is a level-1 type, and in the case ²i = e ²j = 0 she is a Nash type. For
intermediate values of (²i;e ²
j), player i plays ’worldly-like’, similar to the case of an
ALE strategy with (¸
i; e ¸
j
) > 0: She thinks of her opponent as neither perfectly
precise nor perfectly imprecise in his responses, and she considers the fact that j also
takes her own imprecision into account.
In contrast to ALE strategies, which cannot be derived analytically for most games
and parameter pairs (¸
i; e ¸
j
), ANNE strategies can be calculated exactly, in analogy
to solving for the Nash Equilibrium strategies of a game. Figure 2 depicts the ANNE
strategies of game ¡1 (see Table I) for varying parameter constellations, and for both
players (again marked ”Pr(U)” and ”Pr(L)”, indicating the respective probabilities
to choose the Nash strategies). In Figure 2a, ²row is held constant at ²row = 0:2 and
e ²
col varies between 0 and 1, whereas in Figure 2b ²row varies and e ²
col is held constant
at 0:2.
18Insert Figure 2 about here.
As Figure 2a shows, the row player’s ANNE strategy is close to her Nash Equi-
librium strategy U as long as e ²col is below some critical value e ²col
crit ¼ 0:73. For values
of e ²
col above e ²
col
crit, the row player considers the column player to randomize enough to
make the action D her best response against any resulting probability distribution.
As is the case with ALE strategies, the column player’s perceived choice probabilities
depicted in the …gures can equally be viewed as his actual ANNE strategies with the
reversed order of parameters. Hence, Figure 2b shows that under the ANNE assump-
tions, paralleling the ALE case, the column player plays his dominant strategy L with
a high probability regardless of the row player’s actions.
A comparison of Figures 1a and 2a shows that the change in the row player’s
behavior is smoother with ALE strategies and varying e ¸
col
than it is with ANNE
strategies and varying e ²
col. Hence, the ALE strategy model is more ‡exible in the
sense that even for a high precision in her actual responses, the row player may choose
”intermediate” strategies.10
10To explore the applicability of the ANNE strategy model, it is useful to ask for a random-utility
justi…cation of the assumption that players choose ANNE strategies, similar to the reinterpretation of
ALE strategies in Footnote 9. Using standard concepts of Bayesian game analysis, it is possible, for
any pair of parameters (²i;e ²
j) 2 [0;1]£[0;1], to construct a …nite game of incomplete information in
which the players’ equilibrium probability distributions over their choices are equal to the probability
distributions resulting from playing ANNE strategies with parameters (²i;e ²
j). This construction is
193 Data analysis
3.1 Likelihood functions
In this subsection, the basic assumptions underlying the parameter estimations are
formulated – in particular concerning the introduction of type heterogeneity – and
likelihood functions for both the ALE strategy model and the ANNE strategy model
are presented. The following subsections will describe the experimental data, and
present and illustrate the estimation results.
Consider a number of N subjects, i = 1;:::;N, each of whom is confronted with a
set of Hi two-person normal-form games. Let c(i;h) be the action chosen by subject
i in game h, h = 1;:::;Hi. Also, let ci = fc(i;h)gHi
h=1 denote the vector of i’s joint
choices.
Now suppose that choice probabilities are given by a model of normal-form game
play, such as the ALE strategy model or the ANNE strategy model. Let Pihk(µ
i)
be the probability that subject i chooses action k in game h, where µ
i is i’s vector
relegated to Appendix A. Due to this reinterpretation, existence of ANNE strategies is established.
Also, notice that it holds for almost all games ¡ and all parameters (²i;e ²
j) that the ANNE strategy
for a player is unique if either she or her opponent has a strictly dominant strategy, because the
other player then has a (generically) unique best response. This property is useful for the data
analysis in the following section, in that it provides a simple su¢cient condition for the model to
make an unambiguous prediction.
20of parameters determining her choice probabilities in the underlying model: In the
context of ALE strategies, µ
i is given by (¸
i; e ¸
j
); in the context of ANNE strategies,
µ
i is given by (²i;e ²
j). The vector µ
i can also be thought of as subject i’s type. With
this notation, the probability that i chooses c(i;h) in game h is equal to Pihc(i;h)(µ
i).
Hence, the likelihood of subject i’s type µ










An assumption that is implicitly made by the construction of b Li(µ
ijci) is that subject
i’s type is …xed over all games h, h = 1;:::;Hi. (Given this assumption, it is an im-
portant feature of both ALE strategies and ANNE strategies that they allow a player
i with a …xed type µ
i to exhibit a ‡exible behavior over di¤erent games, depending
on the payo¤s of the games.11) Also, it is assumed that the Hi choices are made
independently, given the probabilities Pihc(i;h)(µ
i).
In order to allow for heterogeneity among the N subjects, suppose that µ
i is a
random variable drawn from a distribution with density function g(µ
ij¯); where ¯ is
a vector of parameters determining the density function g(¢). (The vector ¯ will be
11Consider for example Figure 2a and imagine a second game, ¡0
1, in which the critical value ofe ²
col
at which the row player’s strategy changes discontinuously, i.e. a value e ²
col0
crit corresponding to e ²
col
crit,
is lower: e ²
col0
crit < e ²
col
crit. Then for a continuum of parameter pairs (²row;e ²
col) the ANNE strategies of
the row player would prescribe a high probability of choosing the Nash Equilibrium strategy in ¡1,
but not in ¡0
1. A similar observation applies to ALE strategies.
21estimated from the data.) Subject i’s contribution to the overall likelihood is then



















Finally, let c = fcigN
i=1 be the vector containing all observed choices by the N subjects.
Assuming that the N subject types (µ
1;:::;µ
N) are identically and independently dis-
tributed, with densities (g(µ
1j¯);:::;g(µ








It remains to specify the distribution of subject types, g(¢). For the sake of
greater parsimony of the models, standard parametric distribution functions, with
given functional forms, are assumed.12 In particular, suppose for the two parameters
of the ALE strategies, ¸
i and e ¸
j
, that they are independently drawn from two gamma
distributions with densities f°(¸
ij½;K) and f°(e ¸
j
je ½; f K), respectively, for all subjects
i = 1;:::;N. A gamma distribution has a unimodal density function f°(¢j½;K) de-
12An alternative approach would be to use nonparametric density estimations. Stahl and Wilson
(1994, 1995), who base their analysis on a behavioral model that is related to ALE strategies and
involves three type parameters, assume a distribution over the three-dimensional parameter space
that contains several distinct mass points, re‡ecting the di¤erent player types.






K¡1; ¸ ¸ 0;½ > 0;K > 0;







The expected values of ¸
i and e ¸
j
are then given by K
½ and e K
e ½ respectively, their
variances are K
½2 and e K
e ½
2 respectively. Substituting the joint density of ¸






j½;K; e ½; f K) = f°(¸
ij½;K) ¢ f°(e ¸
j
je ½; f K),
into (2) completes the construction of the likelihood function for the ALE strategy
model.
The family of gamma distributions contains a number of familiar distributions
as special cases, such as the Â2-distribution, the exponential distribution, and the
extreme value distribution. Also, it allows for the case that almost all probability




respectively), which corresponds to the case of homogeneity among the subjects.
Hence, although the model contains only the four parameters (½;K; e ½; f K) that are
to be estimated from the data, it allows for a relatively large variety of possible
distributions of behavioral patterns in the experiment.
In the estimations using the ANNE strategy model, both parameters ²i and e ²
j
are assumed to be drawn from independent distributions that belong to the family
23of beta distributions over the range [0;1]; with densities f¯(²ija;b) and f¯(e ²
jje a;e b),
respectively. A beta distribution depends on two distribution parameters a and b;






b¡1; ² 2 [0;1]; a;b > 0;
where ¡(¢) is de…ned as above. The beta density function is symmetric in the case
a = b and asymmetric otherwise, and it can be hump-shaped or U-shaped, depending
on the values of a and b. Its mean is given by a
a+b, its variance is ab
(a+b+1)(a+b)2. Like the
gamma distribution, the beta distribution also contains the special case that almost
all probability mass lies in an arbitrarly small interval around a speci…c value of ².
For any subject i, the joint density of the actual and perceived error rates (²i;e ²
j)
is, under the above assumptions, given by
g¯(²
i;e ²
jja;b; e a;e b) = f¯(²
ija;b) ¢ f¯(e ²
jje a;e b),
which can be substituted into (2).
3.2 Estimation results using all data
Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995) conducted two experiments with 40 and 48 subjects,
respectively, playing a total of 22 symmetric 3x3 normal-form games. Costa-Gomes,
Crawford, and Broseta’s (2001) experiment involved 72 subjects who were confronted
with 18 normal-form (2x2, 3x2, and 4x2) games each. In the latter experiment, all 18
24games were asymmetric and the subjects were divided into row players and column
players, but the games were chosen such that the subjects were confronted with two
almost identical versions of each of 9 games, played with switched player roles (and
with slightly altered payo¤s), so all subjects played almost identical sets of games.13
In all three experiments, no feedback information was given between the subjects’
decisions. Also, importantly, in all sessions the experimenters took careful measures
to ensure that the subjects understood the procedures and the rules of the games.14
Of the 40 games played, 23 have the property that both ALE strategies and ANNE
strategies are unambiguous predictions for the greatest part of the possible parameter
13The data used are those of the ”Baseline” and the ”OB” treatment in the authors’ terminology.
One possible source of noise in the data is given by the fact that the 45 subjects of the Baseline
treatment had to click on the cells of the payo¤ matrices with the computer mouse in order to
see the payo¤s. However, Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) report statistical tests indicating that the
choice behavior between the two treatments was di¤erent only within the limits of chance, so the
data can be pooled. A further di¤erence in experimental design between the experiments occured
concerning the payo¤ determination: While Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) randomly selected one
opponent for each subject in each game, the payo¤s in the experiments in Stahl and Wilson (1994,
1995) were determined by calculating each participant’s expected outcomes from playing against
the distribution of all her possible opponents (i.e., subjects were ”playing against the …eld”) and by
applying a binary-lottery procedure.
14Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) dismissed a total of 20 students who had shown up for the experiment,




) and (²i;e ²j) respectively.15 More precisely, for these 23 games
both the sets of ALE strategies and ANNE strategies are singletons for more than
95% of the possible parameter constellations (so a unique probability distribution over
the players’ actions is predicted for these parameters). In order to avoid equilibrium
selection problems in the present analysis, only these 23 games are used for the
estimations (Games 1, 2, 3, 5, and 8, in Stahl and Wilson, 1994, Games 1, 4, 5, and
12, in Stahl and Wilson, 1995, and all of Costa-Gomes et al.’s games except Games
5A, 6A, 7A, and 8A).16 For all parameter constellations where more than one …xed
point exists, it is, for simplicity, assumed in the data analysis that the subjects play
each ALE strategy or ANNE strategy, respectively, with equal probability.
The 23 games used are shown in Appendix B, which also contains the aggregate
choices of the N = 160 subjects. All of the selected games have unique Nash Equi-
15The parameter range for ¸
i and e ¸
j
is arti…cially restricted to [0;30] in this and all subsequent
parts of the analysis. For larger values of ¸
i [e ¸
j
], the respective ALE strategies in all games are very
close to the case that ¸
i = 30 [e ¸
j
= 30]. In particular, the ALE strategies, or Logit Equilibrium
strategies, for ¸
i = e ¸
j
= 30 prescribe choice probabilities that are essentially identical to the Nash
Equilibrium predictions, for the greatest part of the games.
16The relative numbers of unique predictions made by the models are calculated by solving for the
ALE and ANNE predictions on a …nite grid over the two-dimensional parameter spaces. The cuto¤
value of 95% is chosen somewhat arbitrarily. However, a separate analysis, using the set of (30)
games in which both models make unique predictions for more than 90% of the possible paramenter
constellations, yielded estimation results similar to those reported below.
26libria; three of them have Nash Equilibria in mixed strategies, and the remaining 20
games are strict dominance solvable.
Table II contains the maximum-likelihood estimates of the two models’ respective
distribution parameters. The estimates were obtained by maximizing the logarithm
of (2) using a standard grid-search algorithm. The maximum values of the log-
likelihood functions are also given in the table, denoted by l¤. Figures 3 and 4 depict
the estimated density functions of the parameter pairs (¸
i; e ¸
j
) and (²i;e ²
j) respectively.
Insert Table II about here.
Insert Figure 3 about here.
Insert Figure 4 about here.
As the …gures illustrate, the estimations reveal considerable di¤erences between
the distributions of the subjects’ actual response parameters (¸
i and ²i) and the




j). In particular, it appears that subjects have a systematically distorted
perception of their opponents: Both distributions of the actual response parameters
¸
j and ²j lie more in the ”rational” area of the parameter range, as compared to





i] = 7:20 as compared to E[e ¸
j
] = 3:92, and E[²i] = 0:30 as compared
to E[e ²
j] = 0:58 (with estimated variances of var(¸
i) = 20:83, var(e ¸
j
) = 26:62,
27var(²i) = 0:02, and var(e ²
j) = 0:10).
This discrepancy between the means of the subjects’ actual and perceived re-
sponse parameters can be tested statistically by reestimating the models under the
restriction that the expected values of the respective pairs of parameters are equal,
i.e., under the null hypotheses that E[¸
i] = E[e ¸
j
] and E[²i] = E[e ²
j] hold respectively.
Denoting the log-likelihood of the restricted model by lr, the likelihood-ratio statistic
2(l¤¡lr) is (asymptotically) Â2-distributed with one degree of freedom. The resulting
critical signi…cance levels of rejecting the null hypotheses are p = 0:021 for the ALE
strategy model and p = 2:749¢10¡9 for the ANNE strategy model (two-tailed). Hence,
the observation that subjects on average behave as if underestimating the response
precision of their opponents is statistically signi…cant in the data set, and highly so
under the ANNE assumptions.17 18
The related hypotheses that the actual and perceived response parameters are
17The observation that subjects tend to ignore their opponent’s rationality has, to my knowledge,
…rst been explicitely stated by Beard and Beil (1994) in the context of extensive-form games. See also
the other experimental studies cited in Footnote 3, as well as the related papers by Goeree and Holt
(2000) and Kübler and Weizsäcker (2002), all of which roughly support this hypothesis. Di¤erent
structural models employing ”non-equilibrium beliefs” have been estimated by Costa-Gomes and
Zauner (1999) and Camerer et al. (2002).
18It is important to recall that the analysis in this paper only considers one-shot games. Repeti-
tions of experimental games, or other dynamic settings, may well help the subjects learn to avoid
the observed tendency to ignore the other player’s rationality.
28chosen from identical distributions, i.e., that both ½ = e ½ and K = f K hold under the
ALE strategy model, and that both a = e a and b = e b hold under the assumptions of
the ANNE strategy model, are rejected on levels of signi…cance of p = 5:083 ¢ 10¡9
and p = 1:227 ¢ 10¡10, respectively.
Now consider the question whether the introduction of type variation, in contrast
to assuming that all subject types are equal, does signi…cantly increase the models’
statistical …t in the data. More speci…cally, restricting both ¸




i = e ¸
j
= ¸, amounts to assuming that all subjects play Logit
Equilibrium strategies with a …xed parameter ¸ (see Subsection 2.1). Since this set of
assumptions is also nested in the model (because the familiy of gamma distributions
contains the homogeneity case, where all subjects have the same parameter), one
can again perform a likelihood-ratio test, with the according test statistic being Â2-
distributed with three degrees of freedom. The maximum-likelihood estimation of ¸
is 3:06, and the Logit Equilibrium model is rejected on a signi…cance level of p =
1:083¢10¡39. Analogously, the ANNE strategy model with the restriction ²i = e ²
j = ²
is rejected on a sini…cance level of p = 3:525 ¢ 10¡63; with an estimated value of
² = 0:53.
Also, one can ask whether the hypothesis of type homogeneity can be sustained
at any reasonable level of signi…cance if one allows for a wrong perception of the
opponent. That is, one may formulate the hypotheses that ¸
i = ¸ and e ¸
j
= e ¸ both
29hold for all subjects under the ALE assumptions (for some …xed values ¸ and e ¸),
and that ²i = ² and e ²
j = e ² both hold for all subjects under the ANNE assumptions
(for some ² and e ²). The two according likelihood-ratio test statistics (following Â2-
distributions with two degrees of freedom) yield rejections of these sets of assumptions
on the p = 2:155¢10¡34 level for the ALE strategy model, and on the p = 2:573¢10¡64
level for the ANNE strategy model. One can conclude from the tests described in this
and the previous paragraph that there is substantial variation in the subject pool in
terms of belief and response precision.
Nevertheless, it may be of interest to know whether the estimated perceived and
actual response precisions coincide if one restricts the subject population to be homo-
geneous. (Under the ALE asumptions, this amounts to a test discriminating between
Logit Equilibrium strategies and the more general ALE strategies.) The according
ML estimates of the response parameters are ¸ = 4:08 and e ¸ = 2:18 in the ALE
strategy model, and ² = e ² = 0:53 in the ANNE strategy model. Hence, the two mod-
els yield qualitatively di¤erent results under the restriction of subject homogeneity:
Only the ALE estimations reveal a tendency of the subjects to underestimate the
opponent’s response precision (on a signi…cance level of p = 6:605 ¢ 10¡8).
In sum, the estimations of the models using all available experimental data suggest
that while any assumption of type homogeneity is rejected on very high levels of
signi…cance, there is also a signi…cant tendency for subjects to attribute a lower
30degree of response precision to their opponent than they have themselves. However,
one can argue that much of the evidence supporting this observation relies on the
manner in which type heterogeneity was introduced. Perhaps, the assumed parameter
distributions bias the estimations. To answer this question, the two models were also
estimated separately for each subject, i.e., the expression (1) was maximized using
each individuals’s data only. The results support the observation of belief distortions
made above: Under the ALE strategy model, the ML estimate of ¸
i exceeds the
estimate for e ¸
j
for 115 out of 160 subjects. In 50 cases was this discrepancy signi…cant
on the p = 5% level. (At p = 1%, it was signi…cant in 14 cases, and at p = 10% in 58
cases.) The reverse relationship, ¸
i · e ¸
j
, was estimated to hold for 45 subjects, and
for none of them does ¸
i < e ¸
j
hold signi…cantly at p = 5%. (For 3 subjects it holds at
p = 10%.) The ANNE estimations reproduce these numbers almost exactly: ²i < e ²j
holds at the estimated maximum of (1) in 115 cases, and signi…cantly at p = 5% in
37 cases (at p = 1% in 18 cases, at p = 10% in 59 cases). ²i ¸ e ²
j holds in 45 cases,
and again none of these show the subjects’ actual error rate ²i to be signi…cantly
larger than the perceived error rate e ²
j (not even at p = 10%). Hence, the apparent
tendency to ignore the other player’s response rationality is con…rmed by the separate
estimations for each subject.
Before moving on to results concerning subsets of data, the statistical analysis
of the pooled data set is concluded by reporting goodness-of-…t tests, as well as
31a test of model selection between the two competing models. As a measure of the
models’ goodness of …t, exact chi-square tests were performed, comparing the models’
predictions and the observed decisions. These tests were done for each of the 5+4+
28 = 37 di¤erent player decisions in the games. (For the 14 asymmetric games by
Costa-Gomes et al., 2001, row players and column players need to be considered
separately.) On the level of p = 5%, the predictions of the ALE strategy model (with
the parameter values given in Table II) were rejected for 13 out of the 37 decision
situations, and for the ANNE model in 11 out of 37 cases. Hence, while both models’
predictions are accepted for the majority of the decision situations, the rejection
rates are too high to lie within the limits of chance, as only 5% of the predictions
should be rejected in expectation if the models were literally true. This may point at
misspeci…cations of the models, or at systematic di¤erences in behavior for di¤erent
subsets of games, which will be addressed below.
The fact that the ALE strategy model is rejected more often than the ANNE
strategy model contrasts with the fact that the former yields a higher likelihood than
the latter (see Table II). The question arises whether one model outperforms the
competing model in a statistically signi…cant way. Since neither is a special case of
the other, a model-selection technique for non-nested models is needed. Vuong (1989)
showed that for pairs of non-nested models a surprisingly simple test can be applied,
in analogy to standard likelihood-ratio tests: Let li
ALE and li
ANNE be the two models’
32likelihoods for the decision vector of subject i, evaluated at the ML parameter values
reported in Table II. Then, clauses (i) and (iv) of Theorem 5.1 in Vuong (1989)











asymptotically follows a standard normal distribution, under the null hypothesis that
both models perform equally well.19
For the pooled data used here, the test shows that the ALE strategy model outper-
forms the ANNE strategy model signi…cantly, on a level of p = 4:553% (two-tailed).
The next subsection will demonstrate, however, that this result does not hold for all
subsets of the data.
3.3 Robustness: Estimation results using subsets of data
To give an impression of the robustness of the results, the data are separated following
two criteria. First, the models are estimated for each of the three experiments, in
order to control for possible treatment e¤ects. Second, the data are divided according
to systematic di¤erences between the games played.
19For this result to apply it is essential (as it is for the other likelihood-ratio tests used in this
paper) that the subjects’ types are drawn independently. The numerator of the test statistic is simply
the likelihood ratio of the two competing models, and the denominator is a consistent estimator of
this ratio’s variance, under the unknown true distribution of the data generating process.
33Tables III and IV, in Appendix C, contain the estimation results of the two models
if the data from the three experiments are used separately. Also, the tables contain:
The signi…cance levels of rejecting four hypotheses analogous to those that were tested
in the previous subsection; the number of di¤erent decision situations for which the
models’ predictions are rejected by exact chi-square tests on the level of p = 5%; and
– in the lower panels of the tables – the number of subjects for which the individual
estimations yield each of the two possible parameter asymmetries (with cases signi…-
cant at p = 5% in parentheses). As the tables show, the results are qualitatively very
similar to the results of the pooled data reported above, at least for two of the three
data sets. In both the Stahl and Wilson (1994) data and the data by Costa-Gomes
et al. (2001), the estimated actual response functions of both models are on average
closer to the best response function than the estimated perceived response funtions
are. I.e., the subjects tend to ignore their opponents’ rationality, according to these
estimation results (see the estimates of E[¸
i], E[e ¸
j
], E[²i], and E[e ²
j], reported in
the tables). These di¤erences are, as indicated in the …rst rows of the tables’ sec-
ond sections, highly signi…cant in both of these data sets and in both models, all
corresponding levels of signi…cance being below p = 10¡6. Furthermore, as in the
analysis of the pooled data, all restrictions of type heterogeneity among the subjects
are rejected on even higher levels of signi…cance.
For the remaining data set by Stahl and Wilson (1995), the results of the previous
34subsection are only partly reproduced. While any assumption of type homogeneity
is again strongly rejected, the result of underestimated precision levels shows up
only in the ANNE strategy model, with a signi…cance of p = 0:026. In the ALE
strategy model, the subjects’ perceived response precision is, on average, estimated
to be higher than the actual response precision, on a level of signi…cance of p =
0:062. Apparently, the assumptions concerning the error structure make a signi…cant
di¤erence here. However, a possible reason for this deviation from the general result
pattern is that the ALE strategy model is poorly identi…ed in the Stahl and Wilson
(1995) data set (which is the smallest data set used). This is indicated by the model
selection test by Vuong (1989): In the Stahl and Wilson (1995) data, ANNE strongly
outperforms ALE according to this test, on a signi…cance level of p = 0:001. In the
Stahl and Wilson (1994) data, ANNE insigni…cantly outperforms ALE, at p = 0:219.
In the data by Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), ALE outperforms ANNE at p = 0:009.20
Another question is whether distinctive properties of some of the games lead sub-
jects to exhibit a choice behavior of the speci…c kind described above. In particular,
it is possible that subjects simply fail to identify dominance relations among the op-
ponent’s strategies, but never play a dominated strategy themselves.21 Since most of
20A comparison of the two sets of experimental instructions by Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995)
does not reveal strong di¤erences which could account for large variation in behavior.
21This pattern, which can be seen as re‡ecting the ignorance concerning the opponent’s rationality
in cases of games with dominated strategies, is suggested almost immediately by an inspection of
35the games used contain dominated strategies, such a failure may drive the results of
the analysis using the pooled data. To investigate this possibility, the data analysis
is repeated for two partitions of the set of games: For the …rst partition, de…ne the
set DT as the set containing all games in which at least one player has a dominant
strategy. (All of these 10 games are from Costa-Gomes et al., 2001.) This set is
compared with NDT, the set of games without dominant strategies. Subsequently,
a similar comparison is made between the set DD, containing all games with domi-
nated strategies (for either player), and NDD, the set of games without dominated
strategies.22
Tables V and VI show the results of the estimations for the DT and the NDT
data, organized as in the preceeding tables. In both data sets, the estimated average
the aggregate choice data in Appendix B.
22More precisely, the set NDD contains all games in which no strategy is dominated by a pure
strategy, and DD contains the remaining games. Unfortunately, the set of games in which no
strategy is dominated by any (pure or mixed) strategy contains only the three games with mixed
strategy Nash Equilibria, so I decided to include the four games with strategies that are solely
dominated by mixed strategies into NDD, for two reasons: First, it increases the amount of data in
the NDD analysis. Second, it mitigates the problem that the results are subject to any systematic
di¤erences in behavior appearing only in games without pure Nash Equilibria that are not captured
by the models. While the estimations from the NDD data will certainly have to be interpreted with
caution, it also turned out in a separate analysis, using the set containing only the three games with
mixed Nash Equilibria, that the results are qualitatively similar (see below, Footnote 24).
36response precisions are, once again, di¤erent between the actual and the perceived
response functions of both models, with a tendency to underestimate the opponents’
response precision (though on lower levels of signi…cance than in the pooled data).
Also, both models’ special cases with the restriction to type homogeneity are strongly
rejected, in both data sets. Hence, it appears that the distinction between games
with and without dominant strategies leaves the main results of the previous analysis
essentially untouched.
For the sets of games with and without dominated strategies, DD and NDD, the
results are summarized in Tables VII and VIII. Here, the two data sets yield somewhat
di¤erent results concerning the absolute and relative estimated levels of the average
response parameters: While the games with dominated strategies induce the familiar
pattern of subjects underestimating their opponents’ response precision, the tables
show that for the NDD data set this behavior appears only under the assumptions
of the ANNE strategy model, whereas the ALE estimations result in insigni…cant
di¤erences between the mean levels of ¸
i and e ¸
j
. Therefore, the evidence for the
behavioral pattern described above is weaker for these games.
However, the test by Vuong (1989) indicates that ANNE outperforms ALE in the
NDD data, at a level of p = 6:914 ¢ 10¡17. In the other data subsets, the model
selection test does not yield strong rejections of either model. In the DT and DD
data, ALE outperforms ANNE at signi…cance levels of p = 0:102 and p = 0:126,
37respectively. In the NDT data, ANNE outperforms ALE at p = 0:109. Also, note
that under both models, the estimated actual response precisions are much lower in
the NDD data than in the DD data (so fewer decisions are estimated to be made
randomly in the DD data), pointing at a behavior more consistent with the model
predictions in the ”simpler” games contained in DD.23 24
This discrepancy is con…rmed by the results of the goodness-of-…t tests, reported
in the third section of each of the tables, as the model rejection rate is smaller for the
DD data than it is for the NDD data. An analogous di¤erence appears between the
DT data and the NDT data. The goodness-of-…t tests also show that the rejection
rates are only slightly reduced when subsets of data are considered separately, as
compared to the pooled-data analysis of the previous subsection.
In sum, the separation of the data into subsets mostly con…rms the observed
tendency to ignore or underestimate the opponent’s response rationality. The corre-
sponding e¤ects are statistically signi…cant in all but two cases of (model, data set)
23The lower response precision in NDD may partly explain the apparent identi…cation problem of
the ALE strategy model in these data: With a high error rate (low ¸
i) little can be inferred about
the subjects’ beliefs. It is not clear, however, why such problems should matter less in estimations
of the ANNE strategy model.
24The estimated mean values of the models’ parameters using only the set of games with mixed




] = 7:23, E[²i] = 0:62; and E[e ²
j] = 0:90. The signi…cance levels of rejecting the hypotheses
E[¸
i] = E[e ¸
j
] and E[²i] = E[e ²
j] are p = 0:661 and p = 0:035, respectively.
38combinations. In these two cases, the model used is strongly rejected in favor of the
competing model, which reproces the above observation in both cases, using the same
data.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, two behavioral model of beliefs and responses are presented and esti-
mated from experimental data. The estimation results show that while there is a large
type variation among the subjects in each of the experiments, the subjects on aver-
age are prone to make a systematic prediction error: Under the assumptions of the
models, subjects act as if underestimating the response precision of their opponents.
A rather conservative interpretation of this result is to view it as a critique of an
assumption which is typically made in game-theoretic models of quantal response: In
these models, one usually supposes that experimental subjects are aware of the level
of randomness in their opponents’ motivations (although the experimenter herself is
not). This assumption is relaxed in the above estimations, and the corresponding
statistical tests indicate that it is consistently rejected in the data.
Taking a broader view, one may read the estimation results as an indication of a
more general ”anomaly”: Subjects tend to ignore their opponents’ incentives. One
can then ask whether this evidence is an artifact of the experimental environments
in the laboratories, and in particular of the fact that only normal-form games with
39abstract matrix presentations were used in the analysis. Perhaps, adding a context
to the experiments would help the subjects to see their opponent’s decision problems
more vividly and clearer.
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43Appendix
A A random-utility interpretation of ANNE strategies
In the following, for any given normal-form game a corresponding game with incom-
plete information is constructed, which has a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium strategy
that is observationally equivalent to an ANNE strategy of the original game. Thereby,
existence of ANNE strategies is established.
Summarized in words, the original game is modi…ed in order to make uniform
”trembles” an optimal strategy in the modi…ed game. From the view of an outside
observer, player a will put probability weight ²a on the uniform distribution, and
will put the remaining mass on her best response to player b’s strategy. Also, the
information structure is chosen such that, from player a’s perspective, player b adopts
an analogous behavior (with weight e ²b on the uniformdistribution) regardless of player
a’s private information. The realization of nature’s initial draw in the modi…ed game
corresponds to the random choices of the players.
For a given game ¡ and any pair (²a;e ²
b) 2 [0;1] £ [0;1], let the information







- = fA;B1;:::;Bmb;C1;:::;Cma;D1;1;D1;2;:::;Dma;mbg (4)






are the partitions of - of the two players. For example, if the true state is ! = B1, a
knows that ! 2 fA;B1;:::;Bmbg, and b knows that ! 2 fB1;D1;1;:::;Dma;1g. Using
the payo¤ manipulations introduced below, this corresponds to the case that player
a views the game as the original game (has the same payo¤ as in state A), but b’s
payo¤s are modi…ed such that he optimally chooses his …rst strategy. He is, however,
unsure whether a also has modi…ed payo¤s (D1;1;:::;Dma;1) or not. Denote by Pi(!)
player i’s information set if ! is drawn. Furthermore, let
¹ = ((1 ¡ ²








²a(1 ¡ e ²
b)
ma ;:::;









be the common prior over -, where all elements Bl; l = 1;:::;mb, occur with prob-
ability e ²
b(1¡²a)
mb , all Ck;k = 1;:::;ma, with probability
²a(1¡e ²
b)
ma , and all Dk;l;k =
1;:::;ma;l = 1;:::;mb, with probability ²ae ²
b
mamb.
Given this information structure, a strategy for player i is a mapping fi : - ¡! Qi
where fi(¢) satis…es the condition that Pi(!0) = Pi(!) implies fi(!0) = fi(!). Let
Si be the set of all fi satisfying this condition, i.e., Si is player i’s strategy set.
45(Importantly, the sets of both players’ mixed action pro…les, Qa and Qb, remain
unchanged between the original and the modi…ed game.)
Now consider the following manipulations of the players’ utility functions: The
state-dependent utility function of player a, ua
²a;e ²
b(aa;ab;!), remains unchanged as
compared to a’s utility in the original game if ! lies in fA;B1;:::;Bmbg, i.e., 8l =
1;:::;mb : ua
²a;e ²
b(aa; ab;A) = ua
²a;e ²
b(aa;ab;Bl) = ua(aa;ab). In the case ! 2 fCk;Dk;1;:::;
Dk;mbg, a’s utility is modi…ed such that a chooses optimally the kth action from her


















where F satis…es ¡F < mini;aa;ab ui(aa;ab). Analogously for player b, 8k = 1;:::;ma;






















De…nition 4 ¡²a;e ²
b is the (²a;e ²b)-perturbed version of ¡ if ¡²a;e ²














by expressions (3) to (8).
Proposition 5 The following are equivalent: (i) The player-a strategy ¼a is an
ANNE strategy with parameters (²a;e ²
b) of game ¡. (ii) ¼a is player a’s probabil-
ity distribution vector resulting from a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium strategy of game
¡²a;e ²
b.
46Proof. In any Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of ¡²a;e ²
b, the optimality condition for
player a implies that if it holds for some k (k = 1;:::;ma) that ! 2 fCk;Dk;1;:::; Dk;mbg
– which occurs with probability ²a
ma –, then player a chooses action aa
k. Analogously
for player b, if ! 2 fBl;D1;l;:::;Dma;lg, then ab
l is chosen, 8l = 1;:::;mb. Adding up
the corresponding probability weights and using the uniform functions Pi
0 de…ned in
Section 2, one can hence write any Bayesian Nash Equilibrium distribution (¼a;¼b)
as ¼a = (1¡²a)e ¼
a +²aP a




0, for some strategy pair (e ¼
a; e ¼
b).
More speci…cally, e ¼a is a’s optimal probability distribution over Aa in the case ! 2
fA;B1;:::;Bmbg, and e ¼
b is optimal for b in the case ! 2 fA;C1;:::;Cmag. Notice
that for any information set of a it holds that a’s updated probability of the event
! 2 fBl;D1;l;:::;Dma;lg is equal to e ²
b
mb, 8l = 1;:::;mb, and that a’s updated probability
of the event ! 2 fA;C1;:::;Cmag is (1¡e ²b), so in equilibrium player a does not update
her expectation about b’s information set (equivalently, about b’s behavior) after
receiving her private information. In particular, if ! 2 fA;B1;:::;Bmbg, a expects b
to play according to the distribution ¼b = (1 ¡ e ²
b)e ¼
b + e ²
bPb
0 – as stated above – and
hence chooses e ¼
a so as to solve
max
¼2Aa(1 ¡ e ²
b)u
a(¼; e ¼





which is exactly a’s maximization problem in calculating an ANNE strategy for pa-
rameters (²a;e ²
b) in game ¡. This last statement is true because if ! 2 fA;B1;:::;Bmbg
then a’s utility is the same as in ¡. An analogous observation applies to player b, so
47the two …xed-point problems are equivalent.
Using this reinterpretation of an ANNE strategy as a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
strategy, existence of ANNE strategies for any (²a;e ²
b) 2 [0;1] £ [0;1] follows from
Nash’s Theorem. Also, it holds by the de…nition of trembling-hand perfection that
any Nash Equilibrium of a game which is the limit of a sequence of ANNE strategies
with parameters (²i;e ²
j) approaching (0;0) is necessarily trembling-hand perfect.
B Games
Figures 5, 6, and 7 depict the 23 games used in the analysis of Section 3, taken
from Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995) and Costa-Gomes et al. (2001). The …gures
show the games using the point numbers that were presented to the subjects. Stahl
and Wilson (1994) determined a subject’s earnings for a given game by calculating
the subject’s expected outcome from playing against the distribution generated by
pooling the choices of all her possible opponents. The resulting number of points was
then used as the subject’s number of winning chips (out of 100) in a binary-lottery for
winning a …xed prize of $2.50. In Stahl and Wilson (1995), an analogous procedure
was applied using a prize of $2.00 for each game. Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) paid
o¤ one of the 18 games, paying 40 cents for each point as given in the tables. 36 of
the 72 subjects were assigned the role of the column player. In the experiment, the
games were presented to them as if they were row players in the ”transposed” games,
48to guarantee equal conditions between the two groups.
Insert Figure 5 about here.
Insert Figure 6 about here.
Insert Figure 7 about here.
C Tables
Insert Table III about here.
Insert Table IV about here.
Insert Table V about here.
Insert Table VI about here.
Insert Table VII about here.
Insert Table VIII about here.
49Table I: Game ¡1
L R
U 75; 51 42; 27
D 48; 80 89; 68
50Table II: ML estimates of distribution parameters, using pooled experimental data.
ALE parameters ANNE parameters
½ : 0:35
K : 2:49
e ½ : 0:15




e a : 0:77
e b : 0:55
l¤ ¡930:039
51Table III: Separate estimations of the ALE strategy model for the data from
Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995) and Costa-Gomes et al. (2001).
Data set: SW 1994 SW 1995 CGCB 2001
½ 6:55 7:21 0:23
K 171:24 53:06 1:79
e ½ 0:43 0:07 2:08
f K 0:75 0:82 4:60
l¤ ¡140:468 ¡151:128 ¡571:853
E[¸
i] 26:13 7:36 7:74
E[e ¸
j
] 1:75 11:33 2:21
sig(E[¸
i] = E[e ¸
j
]) 3:322 ¢ 10¡10 0:062 2:078 ¢ 10¡7




) …x over i) 4:706 ¢ 10¡11 3:443 ¢ 10¡6 2:258 ¢ 10¡25
sig(¸
i = e ¸
j
= ¸, …x over i) 4:720 ¢ 10¡19 1:159 ¢ 10¡5 7:509 ¢ 10¡31
# of model rejections at p = 5% 0 (out of 5) 1 (out of 4) 8 (out of 28)
# of subjects with ¸
i > e ¸
j
29 (16 sig.) 25 (9 sig.) 61 (26 sig.)
# of subjects with ¸
i · e ¸
j
11 (0 sig.) 23 (0 sig.) 11 (0 sig.)
Note: Signi…cance level for the signi…cant cases in the last two rows is 5%.
52Table IV: Separate estimations of the ANNE strategy model for the data from
Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995) and Costa-Gomes et al. (2001).
Data set: SW 1994 SW 1995 CGCB 2001
a 10:53 11:20 2:43
b 160:51 36:19 4:38
e a 0:91 0:21 3:99
e b 0:57 0:36 2:40
l¤ ¡134:444 ¡142:432 ¡622:046
E[²i] 0:06 0:24 0:36
E[e ²
j] 0:61 0:37 0:62
sig(E[²i] = E[e ²
j]) 2:936 ¢ 10¡8 0:026 2:473 ¢ 10¡7
sig(a = e a;b = e b) 9:590 ¢ 10¡8 0:006 1:658 ¢ 10¡6
sig((²i;e ²
j) …x over i) 2:356 ¢ 10¡23 3:379 ¢ 10¡11 5:409 ¢ 10¡34
sig(²i = e ²
j = ²; …x over i) 2:532 ¢ 10¡24 1:910 ¢ 10¡10 5:376 ¢ 10¡33
# of model rejections at p = 5% 0 (out of 5) 0 (out of 4) 10 (out of 28)
# of subjects with ²i < e ²
j 28 (14 sig.) 25 (9 sig.) 61 (11 sig.)
# of subjects with ²i ¸ e ²j 12 (0 sig.) 23 (0 sig.) 11 (0 sig.)
Note: See Table III.
53Table V: Separate estimations of the ALE strategy model for the data from
games with and without dominant strategies, DT and NDT, respectively.
Data set: DT NDT
½ 0:09 0:52
K 1:17 2:93
e ½ 0:53 0:17








i] = E[e ¸
j
]) 0:013 0:072




) …x over i) 1:852 ¢ 10¡28 2:277 ¢ 10¡7
sig(¸
i = e ¸
j
= ¸; …x over i) 8:037 ¢ 10¡33 1:742 ¢ 10¡8
# of model rejections at p = 5% 5 (out of 20) 10 (out of 17)
# of cases with ¸
i > e ¸
j
62 (15 sig.) 96 (39 sig.)
# of cases with ¸
i · e ¸
j
10 (0 sig.) 64 (0 sig.)
Note: See Table III.
54Table VI: Separate estimations of the ANNE strategy model for the data from
games with and without dominant strategies, DT and NDT, respectively.
Data set: DT NDT
a 0:86 6:63
b 2:56 12:22
e a 0:37 0:93





sig(E[²i] = E[e ²
j]) 0:023 9:917 ¢ 10¡4
sig(a = e a;b = e b) 0:008 0:004
sig((²i;e ²
j) …x over i) 4:203 ¢ 10¡34 1:423 ¢ 10¡22
sig(²i = e ²
j = ²; …x over i) 4:185 ¢ 10¡33 5:237 ¢ 10¡27
# of model rejections at p = 5% 3 (out of 20) 6 (out of 17)
# of cases with ²i < e ²
j 30 (15 sig.) 96 (39 sig.)
# of cases with ²i ¸ e ²j 42 (0 sig.) 64 (0 sig.)
Note: See Table III.
55Table VII: Separate estimations of the ALE strategy model for the data from
games with and without dominated strategies, DD and NDD, respectively.
Data set: DD NDD
½ 0:09 38:70
K 1:27 171:03
e ½ 1:43 8:04








i] = E[e ¸
j
]) 5:045 ¢ 10¡9 0:942




) …x over i) 2:924 ¢ 10¡29 0:976
sig(¸
i = e ¸
j
= ¸; …x over i) 2:073 ¢ 10¡36 0:997
# of model rejections at p = 5% 7 (out of 28) 4 (out of 9)
# of cases with ¸
i > e ¸
j
106 (29 sig.) 79 (9 sig.)
# of cases with ¸
i · e ¸
j
54 (0 sig.) 81 (0 sig.)
Note: See Table III.
56Table VIII: Separate estimations of the ANNE strategy model for the data from
games with and without dominated strategies, DD and NDD, respectively.
Data set: DD NDD
a 0:86 9:71
b 2:64 14:71
e a 1:35 57:62





sig(E[²i] = E[e ²
j]) 5:997 ¢ 10¡9 3:778 ¢ 10¡7
sig(a = e a;b = e b) 4:495 ¢ 10¡8 2:578 ¢ 10¡6
sig((²i;e ²
j) …x over i) 1:712 ¢ 10¡40 0:001
sig(²i = e ²
j = ²; …x over i) 1:312 ¢ 10¡39 1:592 ¢ 10¡7
# of model rejections at p = 5% 6 (out of 28) 3 (out of 9)
# of cases with ²i < e ²
j 104 (32 sig.) 108 (9 sig.)
# of cases with ²i ¸ e ²j 56 (0 sig.) 52 (0 sig.)
Note: See Table III.
57Figure 1: ALE strategies for game ¡1. Figure 1a depicts the values of Pr(U) and
Pr(L) for ¸
row = 16 (or e ¸
row
= 16, from the perspective of the column player), Figure
1b depicts Pr(U) and Pr(L) for ~ ¸
col






Figure 2: ANNE strategies of game ¡1. Figure 2a depicts the values of Pr(U) and
Pr(L) for ²row = 0:2 (or e ²
row = 0:2, from the perspective of the column player), Figure
2b depicts Pr(U) and Pr(L) for e ²col = 0:2 (or ²col = 0:2).
59Figure 3: Estimated densities of ALE parameters using pooloed data. Figure 3a
depicts the estimated density f°(¸
ij½;K), Figure 3b the estimated density f°(e ¸
j
je ½; f K).
60Figure 4: Estimated densities of ANNE parameters using pooloed data. Figure 4a
depicts the estimated density f¯(²ija;b), Figure 4b the estimated density f¯(e ²
jje a;e b).
































   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 












   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 












   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 











11   T
 0   M
29   B
Game 1: 'T'         'M'       'B'
26   T
 7   M
7   B
Game 2: 'T'         'M'       'B'
14   T
26   M
 0    B
Game 3: 'T'         'M'       'B'
18   T
 0   M
22   B
Gam  5: 'T'         'M'       'B'
 8   T
13  M
19   B
Game 8: 'T'         'M'       'B'
.
Figure 5: Games from Stahl and Wilson (1994).
62   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 












   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 












   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 










 7    T
  40    M
1   B
Game 1: 'T'         'M'       'B'
26   T
  15    M
7    B
Game 4: 'T'         'M'       'B'
14   T
3    M
  31     B
Game 5: 'T'         'M'       'B'
26   T
 3   M
19   B
Gam  12: 'T'         'M'       'B'
.
Figure 6: Games from Stahl and Wilson (1995).
63.  33  U
 3   D
Game 2B:
 70;52    38;29   37;23
 46;83   59;58   85;61
 
25   T
11   B
Game 4A:
  68;46   31;32   
  47;61   72;43    
  43;84   91;65   
14   T
 2   M
19   B
Game 4B:
  26        10
   L         R
  38;57   94;23
  14:18   45;89
.  27  U
 9   D
Game 2A:   21        15
   L         R
  55;79    84;52
  31;46   72;93
.  25  U
11   D
Game 3A:   33        3
   L         R
  75;51    42;27
  48;80   89;68
.  26  U
10    D
Game 3B:   34        2
   L         R
 55;36   16;12  
 21;92   87;43
   31         0          5
   L          M         R 
  32        4
   L         R
  51;69   82;45   
  28;37   57;58    
  22;36   60;84   
33   T
 0   M
 3   B
Game 4C:
  20       16
   L         R
 42;64   57;43   80;39   
 28,27   39;68   61;87
 
32   T
 4   B
Game 4D:
   28        1           7
   L          M         R 
  74;62   43;40
  25;12   76;93    
  59;37   94;16   
 4   T
 5   M
27   B
Game 5B:
  25       11
   L         R
 
 64;76   14;27   39;61   
 42;45   95;78   18;96
 
22   T
14   B
Game 6B:
   6           4         26
   L          M         R 
 
 56;78   23;53   89;49   
 31;35   95;64   67;91
 
20   T
16   B
Game 7B:
   7          2          27
   L          M         R 
  71;49   28;24
  46;16   57;88    
  42;82   84;60   
 8   T
 3   M
25   B
Game 8B:
  17       19
   L         R
  45;66   82;31   
  22;14   57;55    
  30;42   28;37
  15:60   61;88   
33   T
 0  TM
 0  BM
 3   B
Game 9A:
  23       13
   L         R
 67;46   15;23   43;31    61;16   
 32;86   56;58   38;29    89;62
 
30   T
 6    B
Game 9B:
   31         0          0           5
   L         LM      RM        R
Figure 7: Games from Costa-Gomes et al. (2001).
64